There is little sign that this week's talks between President Obama and the Japanese government are likely to come up with anything revolutionary. In fact the U.S.-Japan relationship, though solid and well-established, is not dynamic by nature; it is a relationship which has so far been broadly satisfactory to both sides and in which no-one wishes for change. The United States is happy to provide a standing guarantee for Japan's strategic position, as a quid-pro-quo for Japan's renunciation of an offensive military capacity; and Japan, despite the occasional nationalistic flourish by its governments, has no real wish to step beyond the boundaries imposed by the post-1945 settlement, provided, that is, that the U.S. guarantees for Japan's core interests are effective.

This, of course, is the crunch at the present moment. Japan is wondering exactly how far those guarantees really extend. The text of the relevant treaty is clear enough; but the United States maintains a tacit policy of discouraging adventurism, implying that the guarantees might not operate if her allies appear to be engaging in unnecessary provocations. This hidden caveat is an element in all the American alliances in East Asia. Yes, we will support you if you are the subject of unprovoked aggression; but, if this situation comes about because of your own irresponsible behavior, you cannot necessarily rely on us to back you up. And, unlike the text of the treaties themselves, the conditions of this understanding are nowhere clearly spelt out. The U.S. East Asia policy is based on the principle of strategic ambiguity, with the aim of ensuring that her allies behave properly. So far it has worked well; Japan has largely refrained from rash behavior, while Taiwan's approach to cross-Straits relations has been much more restrained in recent years.

Obama's main objective when dealing with Japan has been to ensure the continuation of the status quo. Like many Asia observers, he will have been concerned by the gesture politics of the current Japanese administration, particularly Premier Abe's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, and the potential for such gestures to raise the temperature in the region and thus increase the chance of somebody making a rash move. He will also be anxious to avoid any escalation around the Diaoyu Islands. The fact that there was a strong military component to his visit should not be taken as an indication that the United States is encouraging Japan militarily; the key aim was to ensure detailed U.S. understanding of Japan's proposed strategy and tactics in these sensitive areas, so as to avoid misunderstanding of Japanese intentions and to assure a degree of coordination between the allies, not for the planning of aggression but for the avoidance of accidental conflict between either ally and China.

This is very much in accordance with China's interests. At the same time as Obama's visit to Tokyo, China (for the first time) hosted a session of the biennial Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao, at which a comprehensive agreement was reached between the 20+ member states establishing a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea. The aim here is to provide a universally accepted code of conduct for unexpected contacts between naval vessels operating in the region, to ensure that harmless maneuvers are not mistaken for acts of aggression and impulsive responses are avoided. This agreement was endorsed by China at the highest level, by PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli. And this initiative obviously ties in with President Obama's mission to Japan, urging his ally to be cautious in conducting any activities likely to be open to misinterpretation.

But of course this code of conduct will only work so long as the activities in question are genuinely harmless and not aimed at securing a tactical advantage; this point will not be lost on Obama and his accompanying team in Tokyo. The United States is inclined to take peaceful Japanese intentions on trust; whether it is always right to do so is a moot point. But at least these talks will have enabled Obama and his naval chiefs to set out U.S. strategic policy with unmistakable clarity, and to leave the Japanese in no real doubt of what actions will receive U.S. support and which will not. At times of tension it is sometimes necessary to lay "strategic ambiguity" aside and make one's views and intentions clear. I do not think it at all likely that China and Japan will take any deliberate steps towards confrontation; the greatest danger arises from possible misinterpretations by one side of moves made by the other. If President Obama's talks in Tokyo and this week's Qingdao agreement have done anything to lessen that possibility, then they will not have been without positive effect.

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit: http://www.h5a3.com/opinion/timcollard.htm

Opinion articles reflect the views of their authors, not necessarily those of China.org.cn