Through political grandstanding, Abe tried to create a false picture of Japan’s full comeback – economically, politically and security-wise – while in fact, the country is sinking. After the Cold War, the Clinton administration concluded that Japan was engaging in a different kind of capitalism. The economic frictions that plagued Japan-US relations in the 1980s turned into a systemic clash in the subsequent decade. Since 2001, tectonic shifts have taken place in the global political and economic landscape. The first decade of the 21st century saw the integration of the Chinese and US markets and the convergence of the two civilizations that they represent. Japan and its brand of regionalism were in danger of being swept away by the waves of the Pacific Ocean. Recognizing this danger, some Japanese scholars suggested that the only way for Tokyo to stay relevant was to cultivate good relations with ASEAN countries and reintegrate itself with the rest of Asia. However, Japan’s vision of an “East Asian Community” was torn apart by US participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2010 and Washington’s push for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. The US pivot to the Asia-Pacific changed the balance of power in the region, built new trans-Pacific bridges and weakened the position of Japan, reducing it to the battlefield of the much trumpeted “AirSea Battle” idea. Seeing all of this, Abe calculated that to keep Japan at the top table, he has to hew closely to the US tune, disturb the regional calm and halt Washington’s westward thrust to the Indian Ocean.

This may be what Abe’s national security strategy boils down to. To achieve his goal, Abe has to distract China. In 2014, China will host APEC leaders and a conference on the peace and reconstruction of Afghanistan, and Beijing cannot afford not to have Japan in these meetings. This helps to explain why at a delicate moment in China-Japan relations, Abe still chooses to make the surprise visit to the Yasukuni Shrine – for the move will put China in a bind: do nothing, and China risks accepting the legitimacy of future visits to the shrine; overreact, and China’s diplomatic agenda will be put in jeopardy. Abe has also made the bet that since Japan has contributed so much, financially and otherwise, to Myanmar’s democratization, Rangoon will not be able to turn Japan away from the ASEAN-plus meetings and EAS that it will host in 2014.

Since the 1993 Seattle summit, APEC has become a platform of China-US cooperation as well as the venue of US domination of Asia-Pacific affairs. Beijing’s priorities for next year’s APEC will reflect the direction of China-US relations; how Afghanistan fares in 2014 will be crucial to Obama’s global strategy and a key focus of China-US collaboration. And the bilateral and trilateral relationships involving China, the United States and Japan will shape Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Hence the multiple purposes of Abe’s visit to the war shrine at this point in time. However, if the prompt expression of “disappointment” from the US embassy in Tokyo is any indication, Abe’s calculated move may not achieve all of the above objectives. On the contrary, he may have lifted a rock – only to drop it on his own toes.

Liu Junhong is a Research fellow at the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations.