Assad state of affairs [By Jia Qiang/China.org.cn]

It has been taken for granted that Bashar Assad's regime will sooner or later collapse. The story of Muammar Qaddafi's Libyan regime has provided strong evidence for such a judgment. But such an analogy can always lead to fault. The tensions in Syria, though still increasing, may not necessarily lead to Bashar Assad's final defeat.

It is true that the domestic political crisis and the armed conflicts in the Middle East are a result of the dissatisfaction of some domestic factions. But the outcomes are not actually decided by the people themselves. Instead, it is the size of external military intervention that is critical.

Muammar Qaddafi was not overthrown by his own people, but by Western powers. Taking advantage of UNSC resolution regarding the no-fly zone, the West, joined by Gulf monarchies, bombed and destroyed Qaddafi's major military facilities and infrastructure. Qaddafi's heavy weapons were neutralized on one hand; on the other hand, the opposition received a great deal of assistance from the air.

External military intervention ultimately led to Qaddafi's demise. If a similarly sized intervention by external military forces occurs in Syria, Bashar Assad's days could be numbered.

However, Syria had not experienced significant external military involvement over the past 19 months, and no strong evidence indicates that regional and global actors will commit the same level of military resources into Syria despite international criticisms of the regime.

China and Russia, advocating for responsible protection, will not approve military intervention after realizing that the West had abused the authorization of the UNSC resolution in the case of Libya.

Even the West itself, learning from lessons in Egypt and Libya, has lost interest in launching another war aimed at regime change. The collapse of Hosni Mubarak has allowed for the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which advocates a diversified foreign policy. The chaos in Libya, as a result of the collapse of Qaddafi's regime, has provided a base for the growth of al Qaeda terrorism, resulting in the assassination of a US ambassador.

Gulf monarchies including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, dissatisfied with Bashar Assad for his policy of allying with Shiite Iran, are enthusiastic about overthrowing Bashar Assad's rule. But unfortunately, they neither have advanced weapons nor troops to solve the problem.

Without substantial external military involvement, Bashar Assad certainly has a chance to outlast the crisis.?Though the oppositions did make a lot of trouble for the regime from Damascus to Aleppo, the occasional bombings and sporadic attacks will not reverse the advantage that the regime holds. Without the support of heavy weapons, the opposition can neither launch strongly-organized and meaningful military operations, nor stably control gains on the front.

The West has been harshly criticizing Bashar Assad for massive killings. Such blame is misplaced. It might be true that military actions by the government have killed many innocent civilians. But it is more reasonable to believe that the government has demonstrated restraint when using force. If not, the government, armed with heavy weapons, could have very easily eradicated opposition strongholds.

The political likelihood of a Syria without Bashar Assad is often talked about in the West. David Cameron, British prime minister, recently claimed that Bashar Assad should be provided with safe passage when visiting the Middle East. Mr. Cameron might be serious. But it is far from the status of current Syria.

Bashar Assad is still commanding an intact army, albeit with modest defections. How should he surrender his power to the opposition? And how can he, who used to be and is still regarded as a major enemy by the West and Gulf Sunnis, trust his personal and his protégées' security to the West?

Political dialogue is the correct path leading to the solution of the Syrian crisis. Bashar Assad might not accept a regime where he personally lacks political and military clout, but many expect that he may give up a significant portion of his power under international pressure. If rational, the opposition should give up the idea of dialogue without Bashar Assad. And the West should stop encouraging the opposition's efforts to topple his regime.

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit http://www.h5a3.com/opinion/jinliangxiang.htm

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