Without Hamas' integration into the Palestinian Authority, there will never be a true and feasible Palestine-Israel peace process, which is closely linked to Israel's survival as a Jewish state, since no progress towards peace can be sustained without approval from the other half of Palestinians who remain marginalized and angry. Whether Israelis like it or not, Hamas' political survival is a fait accompli, despite target killing, "cast lead" bombing and international isolation.

A reconciled Palestinian political sphere also creates the conditions for Hamas to evolve into a normal party-like political faction. It is true that Hamas has shot rockets into Israeli territories and commanded some bombings against Israeli citizens. But this does not mean that Hamas will not change. Many analysts believe that recognition of Hamas as a mainstream Palestinian faction by the international community, in addition to its recognition at home in the 2006 election, will make it a more responsible entity, as Fatah's previous experience indicates.

Why, then, does Israel oppose the deal? There are only two possible reasons: First, as mentioned above, the incumbent Israeli government is not thinking strategically, but rather engaging in short-sighted calculation about Israel's future. That is to say, it does not define its national security as reliant on a two-state solution, but rather narrowly confines it to freedom from terrorism. Second, the Netanyahu cabinet is not ready for a real peace process with Palestinians. A divided Palestine can always be used as a condition for its refusal to seriously engage in the peace process.

The Palestinian reconciliation also indicates some new trends in regional politics. The new development could be attributed to a number of factors including the changes in Egypt, the troubles of the government in Syria, the failure of peace talks with Israel and Mr. Abbas's plans to retire with a lasting legacy, as Ethan Bronner, the New York Times' Jerusalem bureau chief, has pointed out.

But the most important reason among these explanations is that the Palestinian Authority might have finally abandoned the illusion of a US-brokered peace process. Netanyahu's refusal to stop construction of settlements in the West Bank and the US's unwillingness to impose such a freeze in September 2010 both suggest that the last round of negotiations was stagecraft meant to win the Obama Administration votes in the midterm election rather than a good faith pursuit of peace.

The US plays a unique and dominant role in the Middle East, and Israel is vital to the peace process. Therefore, expectation for the US's involvement and Israel's cooperation will still be Palestinians' policy despite a certain degree of disillusionment. But it seems that Palestinians will adopt a more independent approach. The reconciliation, together with Palestinians' plan to apply for a vote for its statehood in the UN this September, should be interpreted as the indication of such a trend. If so, the landscape of the peace process will change.

The reconciliation also reflects the new role of Egypt. Shortly after former President Hosni Mubarak stepped down, Egypt's role in the peace process came under question because of the turmoil. Whether Egypt would continue its pro-US policy became a focus of international attention.

By successfully negotiating the reconciliation, the Egyptian transition government has demonstrated its leadership role in regional politics as an actor with both strong political power and wisdom. Furthermore, just as it allowed Iranian military boats to pass through the Suez Canal, the Egyptian transitional government has proclaimed by endorsing Hamas that Egyptians are ready to adopt a policy different from that of its predecessor.

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn For more information please visit http://www.h5a3.com/opinion/node_7075400.htm

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