Secondly, for the past 20 years the US has not had to face an evenly matched adversary. Let us reiterate that in contemporary military affairs, the decisive factor is no longer mass production, but speed, agility, coordination and precision. This, to a great extent, explains the inability of adversaries to pose a threat to the US military. Chinese military commentator Song Yichang, talking recently about the US F-22 Stealth Fighter, pointed out that using the F-22's stealth technology, flexibility, and active phased array radar, the US can attack any adversary at will, secure in the knowledge that they have no means of defending against, or responding to such an attack.

We have already noted that the strengths of the US military are speed, agility, coordination and precision. But China now has its own stealth fighter – the J-20. Suppose China uses its industrial strength to produce 1000 or more of its relatively inexpensive but high quality J-20s. How could the 200 or so US F-22s respond to this threat? Faced with such a development, the US military might have to change its emphasis from speed, agility, coordination and precision, to planning how to avoid or survive an attack. After all, in war, survival is just as important as the ability to strike the enemy. But building an effective defense against stealth attacks would require huge expenditure on R&D and deployment, certainly no less than the cost of developing stealth technology in the first place. The question is – does the US still have the productive or financial capacity for such massive undertakings?

Finally, we have to ask what is the real state of China's research and development into high end technologies? It is difficult to make a definitive judgment. Perhaps Abraham Denmark is right that China's capabilities are still relatively backward. On the other hand, China's capabilities may have been underestimated. For example, the rapid development of the J-20 undoubtedly came as a shock to the US. Can China continue to make such breakthroughs? The scholar Wang Xiaodong is optimistic on this point. He points out that research and development depends fundamentally on the deployment of human and financial capital. In neither of these is China lacking by comparison with the US. China has large numbers of qualified scientists and engineers able to push the pace of innovation. And the Chinese government commands huge financial resources – unlike the US which is hard-pressed by its domestic and international deficits. Given this background, we can reasonably expect many further breakthroughs along the lines of the J-20, and a steady improvement in the quality of China's military technology.

Another scholar, Hu Angang, although he is not a military specialist, believes that China is poised to make a scientific and technological leap forward over the next decade. If Hu is correct, this would undoubtedly have a huge impact on China's military strength.

For the time being we will have to wait and see whether Song Yichang and Wang Xiaodong's assessments turn out to be closer to reality than Abraham Denmark's.

The author is a writer and commentator in Beijing.

Opinion articles reflect the views of their authors, not necessarily those of China.org.cn.

(This article was written in Chinese and translated by John Sexton.)