If the UN-backed candidate is eventually forced into office by an external force, the foreign troops will most likely have to (like in Afghanistan and Iraq) remain to protect him. But that can also accelerate another bloody civil war.

The UN finds itself in an explosive situation. It's index finger is roundly hooked into the ring of the pin of a Cote d'Ivoire grenade. Its troops are standing on landmines and its representatives are sitting on powder kegs.

But there is no better way forward than through negotiation and learning from history – no matter how long it takes. Take the experiences of Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire. Both have had bloody and costly civil wars. Experience in both countries has also shown that international agencies seeking to apply or impose international law across borders and within national boundaries must always, first, carefully take into account the harsh local realities.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) pursuit of Sudan's President and alleged perpetrators of genocide in Kenya, offer, in both cases, key lessons about the importance of gauging national and regional sensitivities. African leaders have refused to meet the ICC's expectation that they would arrest an elected colleague and bundle him off to the Hague. The Kenyans it accused of genocide have all claimed they were named without ever having been told or questioned by the ICC.

Its actions must have been aimed at achieving certain legal objectives. But the results to date, in both cases, cannot be pleasing to the ICC.

In all these considerations, the UN's recent historical role in wars with tribal roots in Africa cannot be simply brushed under the carpet. In the Rwanda-Burundi/Hutu-Tutsi conflict, the stand-off role of UN troops came in for much criticism. But if the UN erred in Rwanda by refusing to act early to halt advancing genocidal tribal legions, that mistake cannot be corrected by now taking sides in Cote d'Ivoire.

In Cote d'Ivoire, the international community must be careful and avoid throwing the baby out with the bath water. The UN has historically avoided taking sides in protracted national political disputes, but this policy seems to have shifted under this Secretary General.

Where his African predecessor, Kofi Annan, was accused by some Western nations of restraining the world's hand in Rwanda, the Ban Ki Moon approach seems to be quite the opposite. But this seriously violates the principle of non-intervention, non-alignment and independence that has historically underlined the UN's international peace-keeping efforts everywhere.

Use of UN troops in ways that identify them with one side in any national dispute defeats their historical role and image as peacekeepers.

Backing any side in the Cote d'Ivoire standoff is like trying to decide whether half-a-glass of water makes the glass half full, or half empty. But that's where the UN stands in Cote d'Ivoire at the moment.

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit:

http://www.h5a3.com/opinion/node_7107878.htm

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